A conscientious objector is an "individual who has claimed the right to refuse to perform military service " [1] on the grounds of freedom of thought , conscience , or religion. In some countries, conscientious objectors are assigned to an alternative civilian service as a substitute for conscription or military service. Some conscientious objectors consider themselves pacifist , non-interventionist , non-resistant , non-aggressionist , anti-imperialist , antimilitarist or philosophically stateless not believing in the notion of state. Many conscientious objectors have been executed, imprisoned, or otherwise penalized when their beliefs led to actions conflicting with their society's legal system or government. The legal definition and status of conscientious objection has varied over the years and from nation to nation.

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With 3, troops deployed at the moment, Germany should want to properly constitute itself as a responsible power and approach operations risks accordingly. In other areas there is good defence anti-corruption practice that Germany could chose to share with G20 states, for example if it is confirmed to host the G20 summit in The Bundeswehr has no specific operational doctrine that focuses on corruption, although the latest Weissbuch and Defence Policy Guidelines mention corruption risks indirectly.

It seems that while the Bundeswehr is aware of corruption risks in theatre, for example in Afghanistan, it might consider taking an active stance against corruption as too risky. We recommend that the Bundeswehr introduces specific anti-corruption doctrine, which could facilitate useful corruption risk analysis even where Germany is not a lead nation. There are legal restrictions limiting the use of Private Military and Security Companies, but the European Parliament noted that the German government does not have an official definition for either.

The German Defence Minister stated in that Private Military Companies were responsible for their own protection, which suggests armed contractors are used. We recommend that Germany clarifies the legal status of Private Military and Security Companies and creates a transparent framework that regulates their use.

A thorough consultation on this important issue that touches on the very role and nature of the state seems overdue. Germany has some good defence procurement systems and practices in place. But as far as anti-corruption mechanisms are concerned it could rank in Band A for this risk area.

Ursula von der Leyen has clearly identified defence procurement as a priority area in need of reform. We also recommend that exceptions for defence procurement from the Federal Government Directive are minimised.

A more strategic approach to defence procurement should be adopted, as outlined by government audit findings. The German Ministry of Defence remains an important customer for major German defence companies, who at the same time have a strong focus on export markets. This will need to include thorough anti-corruption risk assessments before arms export licenses are being granted — if good practice emerges, this could be shared with others implementing the ATT.

It could also demonstrate to allies and German citizens alike that lessons have been identified from past cases. Parliamentary control of government and the Ministry of Defence's work is provided by Paragraph 1 of subsection a of Article 45 of the German Basic Law, which stipulates the establishment of the Defence Committee in the German Bundestag.

The Committee has two main tasks: the preparation of decisions taken by Parliament, and to provide major support to Parliament in scrutinising the governmental bodies responsible for defence. For the latter task, the Committee can convene itself as a 'committee of inquiry' the only committee to do so in the German Bundestag. This threshold has since been changed to a flexible threshold, depending on the size of the 'Grand Coalition' in order to guarantee the rights of the minority parties.

Additionally, parliamentary groups and members of the Parliament have the right to ask questions based on Paragraph 2 Article 20 and Article Paragraph 1 of 38 of the German Basic Law. In addition, the defence budget is checked by the Federal Audit Office. The opposition was concerned that this might lead to less effective scrutiny of defence policy. The commission, however, concluded that parliamentary control over Bundeswehr deployment should not be weakened, even if other benefits such as e.

Despite Germany having a 'parliamentary army', which means that theoretically any deployment needs to be voted on by Parliament with the Foreign Affairs Committee leading on this process , this has not always happened in practice or been deemed feasible by the government - e. Parliamentary control of government and Ministry of Defence's work is provided by Paragraph 1 of subsection a of Article 45 of the German Basic Law which stipulates the establishment of the Defence Committee in the German Bundestag.

The Committee has two main tasks: the preparation of decisions taken by the Parliament, and providing major support to Parliament in scrutinising the governmental bodies responsible for defence. This threshold has since been changed to a flexible threshold depending on the size of the Grand Coalition, in order to guarantee the rights of the minority parties. Last modified October 22, Germany has two main policy documents: 1 the 'Weissbuch Bundeswehr', which gives an overview of the geostrategic position of Germany and its allies and outlines conclusions for the capability development of the Bundeswehr, and 2 the more specific Defence Policy Guidelines Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien.

While the publication of both of these documents often leads to a lively public debate, it is problematic that they are both published irregularly. The Weissbuch was published five times in the s and two times in the s, but since then has only been renewed twice, in and in The Defence Policy Guidelines, which in contrast to the Weissbuch are only intended to be published every 10 to 15 years, have been published five times since , most recently in and The last Defence Policy Guidelines acknowledged that the political situation needs to be reviewed more often, and it is expected that new guidelines will be published more frequently than previously.

Yet no plans have been released for a current update, and it is unlikely that the MoD will itself commit to an updated schedule for new guidelines. The publication of the Weissbuch in has led to several public discussions, particularly whether the strategic objectives in the document stretch the definitions of German Basic Law regarding foreign engagements of the Bundeswehr too far.

The controversy that ensued contributed to the president's resignation in Overall there is a strong focus on transparency, and the bulk of these documents are publicly available and are widely discussed - with the exception of the Defence Committee's closed sessions. Especially during the last few years, one of the reasons for the lively defence policy debate was the relatively quick change of command in the Ministry of Defence: current Minister von der Leyen is the fourth Minister of Defence within the last five years.

On the one hand, this has led to a large number of discussions about the overall strategic alignment of the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, it may end up delaying the process of reviewing the Defence Policy Guidelines as a result. This hampers regular public consultation before the publication of the documents.

Overall, it seems that while other ministries are included in the review of the policy beforehand see for example the Article on the new Weissbuch , larger public consultations are not taking place criteria for a score of 4. Score maintained. Both documents are revised and published whenever the need arises, whether this be due to strategic adaptations or a reorientation of the Bundeswehr. The MoD and Bundeswehr continuously seek discourse with the public through open days and initiatives such as seminars and lectures in schools or universities in order to promote wide public discussion on security issues.

If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives? There is not a lot of evidence that defence and security institutions practice much openness towards civil society organisations CSOs when dealing with issues of corruption in Germany. It seems that the main reason for this is not so much a general reticence towards CSOs, but rather that that defence institutions do not see a need for specific anti-corruption initiatives. While the overall defence sector in Germany has seen some corruption scandals this past year for example, several German defence contractors were involved in bribery allegations concerning arms sales to Greece , neither the German Bundeswehr nor the Ministry of Defence appear to have been directly involved in these scandals.

The German Ministry of Defence has slightly increased its anti-corruption activities and has for example participated in an initiative of the federal administration and German industry to exchange information about anti-corruption standards. They have also actively participated in a survey by Transparency International, and a member of the high-profile Bundeswehr-Strukturkommission 'Structural Commission' in was the chair of Transparency Germany at the time.

Comment: Statement by the German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level to 3: In its continuous efforts to prevent and combat corruption wherever possible, the Bundeswehr welcomes the mutual exchange of opinions and experiences with any like-minded organisation. At the same time the German armed forces regularly participate in studies carried out by Transparency International. In your answer, please specify which. The Council of Europe Conventions have not yet been ratified.

However, while the ratification of UNCAC is clearly a positive step towards a stricter alignment with international regulations, the Conventions of the Council of Europe are still awaiting ratification and the Council of Europe has stated in the last review in that no progress could be noted. Specific evidence that this will change within the timeframe considered for this review is missing.

Score changed from 2 to 3. Comment: From my point of view, the researcher could have given a score of 3. The question asks whether Germany has signed up to international anti-corruption instruments which it has. While there are shortcomings in the implementation I believe that it might not be correct to claim that there is no evidence of compliance.

Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4: Having signed the United Nations Convention against corruption of 31 October on 9 December , Germany is due to ratify the Convention in autumn On 21 February the German Bundestag took the final legal hurdle to tightening the criminal law on the bribing of delegates. Ratification of further international conventions on corruption, which all have been already signed by Germany will follow suit in due course.

If yes, does the government participate in this debate? There is much evidence of regularly active public debate about issues of defence in Germany.

Media attention is generally focused on current affairs, therefore topics such as the Defence Policy Guidelines or the Weissbuch are most often only marginal issues due to their irregular publication. However, there is a relatively active academic community who keeps discussions about policy issues, especially regarding EU and NATO, alive. Members of the Bundestag, especially leading members of the Defence Committee, are frequently interviewed by the media. However as far as the executive branch is concerned it is almost exclusively the Minister of Defence who is participating in public discussions, and the State Secretaries or the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff are often not included.

Overall there is an active debate but it is far less institutionalised than in the countries mentioned. In particular, there is no evidence of a large number of co-organised discussions with independent think tanks or CSOs as mentioned in the criteria for score 4. Comment: For the many reasons listed correctly by the author, the score should perhaps be a 4 especially relative to comparable countries.

The fact that the Minister of defence serves as the primary link from the Executive is not sufficient evidence to warrant a 3. This provision provides details of expected standards of employee actions and behavior to avoid any misconduct in this area. It also defines processes and responsibilities, such as the role of points of contact in larger agencies. Overall, there is evidence that the Bundeswehr implements the anti-corruption policies of the federal government.

The Government Reviewer below provides additional information on implementation. Mai BGBl. August BGBl. November BGBl. April BGBl. Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 3: The German government has repeatedly emphasised that it perceives corruption as having a detrimental effect on competition and the free market and thus also on companies, businesses and employees.

As a means to counter this threat, parliament is considering extending application of the Criminal Code to business enterprises by introduction of a corporate criminal code [Unternehmensstrafrecht]. The nature of the German legal system means that there are no specific criminal offences on corruption which apply exclusively to the armed forces. Instead the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code apply equally to everybody.

The fight against corruption can now be considered engrained in the moral code of the German armed forces and the MoD in general, particularly but not exclusively as far as procurement is concerned. A wide range of governmental and internal regulations, such as those on sponsoring and the policies on acceptance of gifts and rewards, form the backbone of the continuous battle against corruption.

In addition, according to the regulations on procurement [Vergabevorschriften] any contractor in business with the MoD or Bundeswehr found guilty of corruption or contravening monopoly regulations will be excluded from entering into further contracts with the MoD until permanent restructuring of its organisation rules out further illegal behaviour.

R II 1 works with various law enforcement agencies, drafts guidelines, and supervises their implementation and training. It is tasked with both building integrity and countering corruption, meaning that corruption prevention is as much a focus area as investigations into corrupt practices and activities. Whilst the reorientation of the Bundeswehr downgraded the position of the special investigations branch in the organisational structure and integrated it into the Legal Affairs Directorate, instead of its previous status as an exclusive agency which raised questions as to how effective investigations might be, this has not affected the overall attention granted to anti-corruption policy adherence.

There do not appear to be any other anti-corruption departments within the German MoD, and it is not part of other functions. While most have own anti-corruption representatives, they all report to this special investigations branch within the legal department of the MoD. It is not entirely clear how intelligence agencies such as the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Federal Intelligence Service are part of this process, though the Military Intelligence Service seems to be included.

However, more evidence of effectiveness is required. There do not appear by annual reports published by the R II 1, which would have aided in assessing this.



Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien im Original durchzusehen. Die genannten Dokumente sind unter folgenden Links abrufbar Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 3. Dezember :. E], A man can be exempted or designated to a certain type of service for a limited number of reasons, including if he is the only son in a family or if he has a serious health issue.



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