The warring parties agreed to peace and to a single sovereign state known as Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of two parts, the largely Serb-populated Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though basic elements of the Dayton Agreement were proposed in international talks as early as , [2] these negotiations were initiated following the unsuccessful previous peace efforts and arrangements , the August Croatian military Operation Storm and its aftermath, the government military offensive against the Republika Srpska , conducted in parallel with NATO's Operation Deliberate Force. During September and October , world powers especially the United States and Russia , gathered in the Contact Group , applied intense pressure to the leaders of the three sides to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. The conference took place from 1—21 November

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Vecine pogojev Bosna in Hercegovina ni izpolnila. Tudi ce je katera od teh idej ustrezna, je ni mogoce uresniciti brez nove vojne. V ekstremnih primerih bi jim lahko celo zamrznil place. Na tej tocki bi morala Evropska unija prevzeti odgovornost za ohranjanje stabilnosti Bosne in Hercegovine in njen napredek.

Vendar pa jih niti ne bo potreboval. Za garancijo miru in napredka Bosne in Hercegovine bo morala Evropa po odhodu visokega predstavnika zgolj prepricati bosansko-hercegovsko vodstvo, da drug drugega ne bodo mogli premagati z lobiranjem za podporo Evrope. Da torej nobena skupina ali entiteta ne more vsiliti svoje volje drugim ob njihovem nasprotovanju.

While the physical scars of the Bosnia war have healed, political agony and ethnic tension persist. Real peace requires a new constitution and bottom-up political change.

Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH, or Bosnia poses little risk of deadly conflict, but after billions of dollars in foreign aid and intrusive international administration and despite a supportive European neighbourhood, it is slowly spiralling toward disintegration. The political elite enjoys mastery over all government levels and much of the economy, with no practical way for voters to dislodge it.

A countrywide popular uprising torched government buildings and demanded urgent reforms in February , but possible solutions are not politically feasible; those that might be politically feasible seem unlikely to work.

Years of well-intentioned reforms, imposed or urged, have left a governing structure leaders circumvent, ignore or despise. With growing frequency, Bosnians ask the questions that preceded the war: shall it be one country, two, or even three; if one country, shall it have one, two or three constituent entities, and how shall it be governed? The heart of the problem is in Annex 4 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, known as the constitution and in several changes imposed by courts and international officials.

It defines BiH as a state of two entities, in effect but not explicitly federal, but also the state of three constituent peoples Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs , and yet, simultaneously, of all citizens. A suffocating layer of ethnic quotas has been added, providing sinecures for officials increasingly remote from the communities they represent. The tensions created by constitutional schizophrenia are pushing BiH to the breaking point.

A new design is needed: a normal federation, territorially defined, without a special role for constituent peoples, but responsive to the interests of its three communities and the rights of all citizens. Existing proposals try to squeeze the constituent peoples into an ostensibly ethnicity-blind structure on top of which a complicated network of indirect elections would allow party leaders to choose the executive with as little democratic input as possible.

The EU and the outside world support this tinkering with Dayton to satisfy the decision, though such proposals have manifestly failed. Bosnians need to rebuild their political structure from the bottom up. There is no consensus on where to start, but Bosnia may have to break from its political system based on constituent peoples and their rights. Crisis Group has not reached this conclusion lightly.

It reflects long experience and observation that no one has been able to frame a broadly attractive vision on the existing flawed basis. With stresses and frustrations accumulating in all communities, Bosnia must conceive new foundations to survive. Agreement may take years and much experimentation and debate, but the search should begin. BiH is home to three political communities: those primarily loyal to the Bosnian state, usually but not always Bosniaks; those loyal to Republika Srpska RS , usually Serbs; and those desirous of Croat self-government, usually Croats.

Giving the Croats what they want, their own entity to make a three-entity Bosnia, is absolutely rejected by Bosniaks. Building virtual representative units for the three communities, possibly with new emphasis on municipalities as basic building blocks, is intellectually plausible but requires a leap of faith few seem ready to take.

A purely civic state is inconceivable to Serbs and Croats. Neither leaders nor civil society have deeply explored alternatives to three constituent peoples in two entities; any consensus would take time. Nevertheless, the goal should be clear. The same body could be the executive government. Some decisions should require consensus, others a majority. All three communities should be represented, not necessarily in equal numbers.

There should be no ethnic quotas; representation should reflect self-defined regions and all their voters. Poorly performing, unnecessary state agencies and ministries should be slimmed or abolished, with powers reverting to the entities; but the state would need new ministries and agencies required for EU membership. They could be abolished, their powers divided between the municipalities and the entity government. A multi-ethnic coalition persists, election to election, with only minor adjustments.

Membership is earned by winning opaque intra-party competitions in which voters have little say. Change in this system can only come from within: Bosnians should join parties and participate in genuine leadership contests. Sextet power is further buttressed by control of hiring, investment and commercial decisions at state-owned firms, a situation that chokes private investment and growth.

Bosnia is unimaginable without the work of international officials who did much to shape political institutions and implement peace, but the international community has become more obstacle than help. The only way to encourage leaders to take responsibility is to treat the country normally, without extraneous tests or High Representatives. The EU could signal a new start by stating it will receive a membership application — the first of many steps on the long accession road.

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our privacy policy for more details. Andes Central America. Watch List — Spring Edition. To Calm Turmoil, U. Leaders Must Stop Courting Conflict. Originally published in Dnevnik. Related Tags Bosnia And Herzegovina. Up Next. Executive Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH, or Bosnia poses little risk of deadly conflict, but after billions of dollars in foreign aid and intrusive international administration and despite a supportive European neighbourhood, it is slowly spiralling toward disintegration.

Yes, I Agree.


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